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Abstract
This paper studies the design of child-care policies when redistribution matters. Tradi-
tional mothers provide some informal child care, whereas career mothers purchase full time
formal care in the market. The sorting of women across career paths is endogenous and
shaped by a social norm about gender roles in the family. Via this social norm traditional
mothersinformal child care imposes an externality on career mothers, so that the market
outcome is ine¢ cient. Informal care is too large and the group of career mothers is too small
so that ine¢ ciency and gender inequality go hand in hand.
In a rst-best, full information word redistribution across couples and e¢ ciency are sep-
arable. Redistribution is performed via lump-sum transfers and taxes which are designed
to equalize utilities across all couples. The e¢ cient allocation of child care is obtained by
subsidizing formal care at a Pigouvian rate.
However, in a second-best settings, we show that a trade-o¤ between the reduction of
gender inequality and redistributive considerations emerge. The optimal uniform subsidy is
lower than the Pigouvian level. Under a nonlinear policy the rst-best Pigouvianrule
for the (marginal) subsidy on informal care is reestablished. While the share of high career
mothers continues to be distorted downward for incentive reasons, this policy is e¤ective in
reconciling the objectives of reducing the child care related gender inequalities and achieving
a more equal income distribution across couples.
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1 Introduction
While female labor force participation has been increasing steadily over the last decades (Goldin,
2006 and 2014b, Kleven and Landais, 2017) mothers continue to be the main providers of child
care within the family (e.g., Paull, 2008; Ciccia and Verloo, 2012). Maternity leave and other
child related career breaks or part-time work contribute in a signicant way to the persistence
of gender inequalities in the labor market. The so called child penaltyappears to explain up
to about 80% of the gender wage gap; see Kleven et al. (2018).
As a possible reason for the persistence of child-care compatible (part-time) work and child
penalties, many studies point to social norms shaping womens preferences over family and career
(see Fortin 2015, Farré and Vella 2013, Bertrand et al. 2015, Bursztyn et al. 2017 and Kleven
et al. 2018, among others). Social norms may contribute to the di¤erential sorting of men
and women across occupations with women entering low pay occupations that allow for shorter
working days or more exible working hours (see Goldin, 2014 and Card et al. 2016).
During the last ve decades, most developed countries have put into practice multiple child
policies with various declared goals, including gender equity, higher fertility, and child devel-
opment. The policies who seem to have been the most e¤ective in reducing gender disparities
are child care provision and subsidization. Evidence indicates that early childhood spending
contributed substantially to enabling women to combine working life and motherhood, and to
altering social norms regarding gender roles; see Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017).
Reducing gender disparities in the labor market is not the unique concern which is relevant for
child care policies. Redistribution across income levels has been the major issue for the design of
tax and expenditures policies, it has lead to the emergence of the concept of welfare statewhich
applies to all developed countries albeit to a di¤erent degree; see Boadway and Keen (1993).
Unfortunately, the objective of reducing gender disparities in the labor market and redistributive
concerns may be conicting goals. Specically, child care provision and subsidization may be
regressive if the parents who benet more from the policy are the ones with relatively higher
income. This seems to be the case in most OECD countries, where very young children (aged
0-2) are more likely to use early childhood education and care services when they come from
relatively advantaged socio-economic backgrounds; see OECD (2017).1
1 In Ireland, the participation rate for children in low-income families is, at about 20%, less than one-third of
that for children from high-income families (66%). In Belgium, France and the Netherlands, participation rates for
children from low-income backgrounds are generally a little higher (around 30-40%), but are still only about half
those for children from the richest families (roughly 60-75%). Similarly, in a number of OECD countries children
are also more likely to use early childhood education and care when their mother is educated to degree-level.
In the United Kingdom, the participation rate for children with a mother that has attained tertiary education
is at 41%, 17 percentage points higher than the rate for children with mothers that have not attained tertiary
education (24%). In Switzerland, the gap is as large as 30 percentage points.
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Surprisingly, the interplay between child care provision/subsidization and redistribution has
so far to a large extent been ignored in the literature.2 We o¤er a fresh new look at this issue and
propose a theoretical model whose crucial ingredient is an ine¢ cient child penalty created by
a gender norm. We then investigate the interaction between child penalties, child care policies
and redistribution. Our research questions are the following. To what extent reducing the child
care related gender inequalities and achieving a more equal income distribution are conicting
objectives? How can this potential conict be mitigated by an appropriate design of the child
care policies?
We consider a model in which spousescareer prospects are perfectly correlated. However,
while fathers always enter a high-career path, mothers can either enter the same high-career
path or a low-career one. In the latter case mothers are traditionalbecause they are able to
provide some informal child care. Career mothers instead need to purchase full-time formal
care in the market. The sorting of women across career paths is endogenous and shaped by a
social norm about gender roles in the family. Via this social norm traditional mothersinformal
care imposes an externality on career mothers, who feel guilt if they provide less informal
care than the average amount provided by woman. Hence, in the laissez-faire informal care
is too large and the share of career mothers is too small. This translates in ine¢ ciently high
child penalties so that ine¢ ciency and gender inequality go hand in hand. Furthermore, career
choices exacerbate inequalities (as measured for instance by the Gini coe¢ cient) because higher
incomes are concentrated on a smaller share of the population, which further decreases social
welfare. We study the optimal design of linear and non-linear child care policies when the
government is concerned with both e¢ ciency, corresponding to a reduction of gender inequality,
and redistribution.
In a recent paper, Barigozzi et al. (2018) have examined the interplay between social norms,
career choices and child-care decisions. We build on their model but adopt a di¤erent modeling
strategy for the social norm. The research questions addressed in the two papers are completely
di¤erent. Barigozzi et al. (2018) study whether eradicating or mitigating gender norms is socially
optimal and how the design of specic policies (a uniform subsidy on child care, a women quota
and parental leave) helps to achieve either one or the other objective. Redistribution is not a
concern of the government in their model. In this paper we focus on the design of child care
2Two exceptions are the literature on in-kind transfers and optimal taxation (Cremer and Pestieau 1996)
and the literature on optimal taxation with endogenous fertility. In the latter, low-ability families may choose to
specializein quantity, that is, to raise more children relative to higher-ability households. Child-related subsidies
can, therefore, be used to enhance re-distribution: family size can be employed as an indicator for the earning
capacity of the household (Cigno 1986). We totally depart from that literature because the number of children
is exogenous in our model. In addition, we do not solve a model of optimal income taxation, we instead design
non-linear child care subsidies.
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subsidies when income redistribution is relevant.
We show that, in a rst-best, full information word e¢ ciency and equity are separable.
Redistribution is performed via lump-sum transfers and taxes which are designed to equalize
utilities across all couples. Child care policies, on the other hand, are designed to achieve the
appropriate level of informal child care and the e¢ cient share of high career couples. Since
the underlying problem is an externality, it is not surprising that the e¢ cient policy involves
a Pigouvian subsidy on market child care, which acts like a Pigouvian tax on informal care.
And once child care levels are e¢ cient, the induced career choices are also e¢ cient. However,
since this policy taxes away all extra earnings of high-career couples, it is of course not incentive
compatible and it cannot be implemented when the spousesearning opportunities in the high
career path are not observable. This leads to the study of feasible second-best policies.
We consider two types of second-best settings. First, we study a linear subsidy and we
show that it involves a trade-o¤ between the reduction of child penalties and redistributive
considerations. Consequently, the optimal subsidy is lower than in the case where the government
is concerned with e¢ ciency (or gender inequalities) only.
More interestingly, we then show that this trade-o¤ depends on the linearity of the policy.
To see that we characterize the optimal incentive compatible policy, that is the non-linear policy
constrained by the information structure. We show that this policy reestablishes the rst-best
Pigouvianrule for the (marginal) subsidy on informal care. In other words there is no longer
a trade-o¤ between child care subsidies and income redistribution. High-career couples enjoy
positive rents and their share has to be reduced (compared to the rst-best) to mitigate these
rents. Consequently the outcome remains second-best. Still the policy is e¤ective in reconciling
at least to some degree the objectives of reducing child penalties and achieving a more equal
income distribution across couples. Note that the subsidy on formal care can be implicit in the
case where child care is provided in kind.
The information requirement to implement this policy is rather minimal. It is su¢ cient that
career paths or levels of formal child care are publicly observable. Amongst these the rst one
appears to be the least restrictive. When consumption of formal child care is observable for each
couple, topping-up of child care provided in kind can be prevented, which in practice may
appear di¢ cult. But our analysis shows that when career paths are observable, topping up, is
not a problem anyway. High career couples will then receive full time care (in kind or subject to
a non linear subsidy) and they do not want to supplement this level by care paid at full market
prices anyway. And due to the implicit or explicit subsidy, low career couples consume already
more formal care then they would at market prices.
From a practical perspective, the non linearity or the policy introduces a measure of means-
testing into our policies because child-care fees e¤ectively di¤er across income levels. Because of
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the information limitations, means-testing remains quite basic and couples within a given career
path cannot be distinguished. Still even this basic screening device has a rather dramatic impact
in reconciling redistribution and child care policies (see also Sections 7 and 8 on this point).
2 The model
Consider a population of couples with children, the size of which is normalized to one. Each
couple consists of a mother m, a father f, and a given number of children. Couples choose
their career path, the mode of child care, and their consumption.
There exist two types of career paths (indexed by j). First, a full engaging high-career path,
j = h, where individuals who take up this career path have to work an entire day which we
normalize to one. Second, a less demanding low-career path, j = `, o¤ering exible working
hours, where individuals can freely choose how much time to spend in the labor market. The time
not spent at work can be used for child care ci, where i = f;m. Both jobs pay the wage rate y,
but the high-career path comes with additional future earning possibilities qi. We let qf 2 [0; Q]
and qm = qf 2 [0; Q]; with  2 (0; 1]. An  < 1 captures pure discrimination: unequal pay
for equally qualied workers, as it continues to be documented in nearly all developed countries.3
Observe that while  < 1 adds a measure of realism to the descriptive part of our model, it
will not be essential for our results that all continue to hold when  = 1. Future revenue qf is
distributed according to the density function f (:) ; with the cumulative distribution being F (:).
Future earning opportunities are perfectly correlated in a couple. Consequently, there is a single
level of qm associated with each level of qf .4
Care for children provided by the spouse(s) is denoted by ci (i = f;m), while that bought
in the private market is denoted by cp. The latter costs p per unit of time. We let p = y,
meaning that the current salary of one member in the couple exactly covers the costs of buying
full-time child care on the private market.5 The children must be taken care of for the entire
day, implying cf + cm+ cp = 1. Couples in which both parents choose the high-career path thus
have to fully rely on private child care. When parents enter a exible job their salary decreases
proportionally to the time devoted to care. Informal and private care constitute a family public
3The parameter  generates the unexplained component in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the GWG;
see Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). Equation (4) below presents the decomposition of the GWG obtained in
our model.
4Assortative mating is commonly observed and has been increasing over the last decades; see Chiappori et al.
(2017) and references within.
5This assumption is simply a normalization that has no relevance for our results. Without it we would obtain
a term proportional to (p   y) in the rst-order conditions with respect to child care. This would a¤ect the
equilibrium levels of child care but otherwise all other results are not a¤ected.
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good and its value to the parents is given by:
G (cf ; cm; cp) = v(cf + cm) + v(cp);
where v0 > 0; v00 < 0 and v(0) = 0. Care provided by the father and mother are thus perfect
substitutes while informal and private care are imperfect substitutes, with private care being
(weakly) less welfare-enhancing than informal care,  2 (0; 1].6 Apart from child care, each
parent derives utility from consumption of a numeraire commodity x.
Following Akerlof and Kranton (2000; 2010), individuals may su¤er a disutility by deviating
from the social categories that are associated with their identity (that is, an individuals sense
of self), which causes behavior to conform toward those norms. We assume that individuals
desire to conform to the behavior of the group they belong to, namely the behavior of women
for mothers and the behavior of men for fathers. Mothers feel guilt if they provide less informal
care than the average amount of care provided by woman in the society.7 Fathers, by contrast,
su¤er from social stigma when they devote more time to informal care than the average amount
of time devoted to care by man in the society.8
Given our assumption on the exibility associated with the two available career paths, the
social norm for mothers corresponds to the cost of the full-time job given by m(maxf0; cm cmg),
where cm is the average time spent with children by mothers in the society. For fathers, the
social norm translates into the cost of the exible job given by f (maxf0; cf   cfg), where cf is
the average time spent with children by fathers. The parameter i 2 [0; 1]; i = f;m; reects the
costs of norm deviations.
The timing of couplesdecisions is as follows: rst, parents choose their career path and
then, in the second stage, they choose consumption and the amount of child care (be it formal
or informal). Parents act cooperatively and maximize the sum of their utilities:
W = xm + xf +G(cf ; cm; cp)  m(maxf0; cm   cmg)  f (maxf0; cf   cfg): (1)
2.1 Couples optimization
We rst analyze the choice of child care activities for a given career path. Then, by proceeding
backward, we consider the choice of career path made by the couple. This allows us to determine
the average child care provided in the society and thus to dene the cost of the social norm both
6See, for instance, Gregg et al. (2005), Bernal (2008), and Huerta et al. (2011).
7The psychology literature points out that social norms on gender roles may cause mothers who work full-time
to feel guilt when delegating the care of their children to others; see, Guendouzi (2006), Rotkirch and Janhunen
(2010) and Rose (2017), among others.
8See, as an example, Haas and Hwang (2019) and references within. For a general overview see
Paternity Leave: The Rewards and the Remaining Stigma The NYT, Nov. 7, 2014; available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/upshot/paternity-leave-the-rewards-and-the-remaining-stigma.html.
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for fathers and for mothers. We consider only decisions made at the second stage by the couples
that turn out to be relevant for our analysis, namely the couples where (i) only the father enters
the high-career path while the mother enters the exible job market (traditional couples), and
those where (ii) both parents take up the high-career path; see Appendix A.1 for the dominated
couplesdecisions.9
Traditional couple. We denote welfare of this couple by Wh`, where the rst subscript
refers to the fathers career choice and the second subscript refers to the mothers career choice.
Since the father took up the high-career path he is not able to take care of the children, and
cf = 0. Hence, c

f   cf  0 and the father does not su¤er any cost associated with the social
norm. Noting that cm + cp = 1; the couple chooses child care private provision to maximize (1)
where xh` = xm+xf = y+ q because p = y. Optimal level of formal child care is thus implicitly
determined by
v0(cp) = v
0(1  cp): (2)
First-order condition (2) indicates that traditional mothers purchase formal care, cp, in the
market up to the point where marginal utility from formal care equals the marginal benet from
informal care, 1  cp.
The marginal norm cost for traditional mothers, m; does not enter the FOC (2); they do not
su¤er any norm cost because by denition we have chh = 0 so that c

h` = 1  cp > c > chh = 0.
The indirect utility of this h` couple as a function of private child care cp writes:
W h` = y + q + v(1  cp) + v(cp)
High-career couple. High-career couples have no child care decision to make; they have
to buy the full amount of private care on the market. Since cf = 0; the father does not su¤er
any cost associated with the social norm. As a result, the social norm for fathers is binding
neither in traditional nor in career-couples. Thus, we can simplify the notation writing cm = c
and m = : High-career mothers su¤er the cost from deviating from the norm and the couples
welfare amounts to:
W hh = y + q(1 + ) + v(1)  c:
Note that high-career couples who exclusively have to rely on private child care are those with
higher consumption levels, that is xh` = y + q < x

hh = y + q(1 + ).
We are now in the position to analyze the couples decision about the two partnerscareer
paths. Families have to choose whether to be a high-career hh couple fully relying of formal
9Only the mother in the high-career path is dominated by having both parents entering the high-career path
which involves no norm costs for the father and higher future benets. Similarly, having both parents entering
the low-career path can never be optimal since then the couple forgoes future benets qf . As a result, the social
norm for fathers is never binding in equilibrium.
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child care, or to be a traditional h` couple where the mother provides some informal care. A
couple will become a high-career couple if it is beneciary to do so, that is if W hh W h`, or if
q  q^  1


v(1  cp) + v(cp)  v(1) + c

:
The marginal couple q^ is the couple where parents are indi¤erent between belonging to a
traditional and to a career couple. Given q^ we can now dene average informal child care in
society:
c =
Z q^
0
ch`f(q)dq = F (q^
)ch` = F (q^
)(1  cp):
2.2 Market outcome
An allocation is given by the identity of the marginal couple and by the amount of child care
provided by traditional couples. The following proposition characterizes the laissez-faire alloc-
ation.
Proposition 1 (Characterization of the laissez-faire) When mothers who do not provide
child care su¤er from deviating from the social norm, i.e.  > 0, and/or the job market su¤ers
from gender discrimination,  < 1, then:
(i) it is never optimal for fathers to take up the low-career path;
(ii) the marginal couple is given by
q^ =
1


v(1  cp) + 

v(cp)  v(1)

+ F (q^)(1  cp)

; (3)
couples with future job opportunities higher or equal to the threshold q^ choose the high-
career path for both parents;
(iii) private care purchased by traditional couples, cp, satises equation (2).
There are both traditional and career couples in the economy if q^ 2 (0; Q). From (3),
an interior solution requires that q^ exists such that q^ = (1=)[v(1   cp) + 

v(cp)  v(1)

+
F (q^)(1  cp)] < Q: Due to the concavity of v () ; v(1  cp)+

v(cp)  v(1)

> 0 holds so that
the previous inequality is always met provided that Q is su¢ ciently large and F (q^) is concave,
which we assume in the remainder of the paper.
The gender wage gap (GWG) is dened as the di¤erence in total income earned by mothers
and fathers in equilibrium and is given by:
GWG =
Z Q
0
[y + q]f(q)dq  

F (q^)ycp +
Z Q
q^
[y + q]f(q)dq

= F (q^)
 
1  cp

y| {z }
child penalty
+
Z q^
0
qf(q)dq| {z }
adverse sorting
+
Z Q
q^
(1  )qf(q)dq| {z }
plain discrimination
(4)
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The GWG decomposes in the gap between the hours worked because of family duties, and in
the di¤erent return to labor supplied in sectors where man and women are employed. The rst
term in (4) thus represents child penalty (see Blau and Kahn 2017; Kleven et al. 2018):
mothers in traditional couples do not work full time, but spend part of their time to provide
informal child care. Child penalty thus depends on average informal care, c = F (q^)
 
1  cp

;
provided by traditional mothers. The second term accounts for the fact that women forego
the extra earning opportunities associated with the high-career path. Interestingly, both child
penalty and adverse sorting are a¤ected by social norms and child care decision through
q^. They decrease when the share of career mothers in the society increases. The model thus
o¤ers a clean explanation of how social pressure determines women sorting and thus their low
participation in leading positions together with lower wages. Finally, the last term in (4) captures
the unexplained component of the GWG of the OaxacaBlinder decomposition, or the plain
discrimination part; it vanishes when  = 1.
Before turning to the design of child-care policy, we dene the social planners objective
function and the optimal allocation.
3 The optimal allocation
The social planner is interested both in e¢ ciency and in redistribution. Specically, the social
welfare function is assumed to be a concave transformation, 	(); of the familieswelfare func-
tions in order to capture inter-family inequality aversion.10 Thus, a rst-best (fb) allocation is
dened by aggregate consumption levels xfbh` (q) and x
fb
hh (q), by the indi¤erent couple, q^
fb (which
determines the share of female participation in the high-career path), and by the level of formal
child care chosen by traditional couples, cfbp (q) for q < q^fb (recall that, by denition, c
fb
p (q) = 1
for q  q^fb).
Specically, the social planner chooses fxhh (q) ; xh` (q) ; cp (q) ; q^g to maximize the following
welfare function:
SW =
Z q^
0
	
 
xh`(q) + v(1  cp(q)) + v(cp(q))

f(q)dq
+
Z Q
q^
	
 
xhh(q) + v(1)  c

f(q)dq (5)
subject to the budget constraint:
y +
Z Q
0
qf(q)dq +
Z Q
q^
qf(q)dq =
Z q^
0
xh`(q)f(q)dq +
Z Q
q^
xhh(q)f(q)dq; (6)
10 In Barigozzi et al. (2018), redistribution across income levels is not relevant because they assume quasi-linear
preferences with a constant marginal utility of income. While the excessive share of traditional couples does also
a¤ect the income distribution by making it more concentrated this in itself does not a¤ect welfare in their setting.
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where c =
R q^
0 (1  cp(q)) f (q) dq.
In Appendix A.2 we derive the optimal allocation that is characterized as follows.
Welfare is constant irrespective of the couples career path and their future earning possib-
ilities:
W fbh` (q) =W
fb
hh(q) =W
fb 8q;
Formal child care is such that cfbp (q) = c
fb
p 8q and is implicitly given by:
v0(cfbp ) + [1  F (q^fb)] = v0(1  cfbp ): (7)
The left-hand side denotes the social marginal benet of formal child care while the right-
hand side denotes the social marginal cost of informal care. Note that the above equation
is independent of a traditional couples q. Compared to the laissez-faire described in (2), the
marginal benet contains an additional term [1 F (q^fb)] which reects the negative externality
of informal care provision on type-hh couples whose share is 1  F (q^fb). Informal child care is
thus ine¢ ciently high in the laissez-faire, which translates in underconsumption of formal care:
cp < c
fb
p . Not surprisingly c
fb
p and q^fb do not depend on the social welfare function 	. This is
due to the quasi-linearity of preferences. All Pareto-e¢ cient allocations imply the same levels
of cp and q^, but may di¤er in consumption levels. But since we use a symmetric social welfare
function any concave 	 implies that in the rst-best utility levels are equalized. However, the
degree of concavity will matter in the second-best settings considered below.
Interestingly, W fbh` (q) =W
fb
hh (q) and c
fb
p (q) = c
fb
p 8q imply that the consumption of couples
is constant in each career-path: xfbh`(q) = x
fb
h` and x
fb
hh(q) = x
fb
hh 8q. This in turn implies that:
xfbhh   xfbh` = v(1  cfbp ) + [v(cfbp )  v(1)] + F (q^fb)(1  cfbp ) > 0 (8)
The above expression shows that high-career couples do not get higher consumption because of
their higher q (as it was the case in the laissez-faire), but because the government compensates
them for their utility loss due to the cost of the social norm and to the purchase of full private
care (whose utility is mitigated by the parameter ). Finally, in Appendix A.2 we show that
the FOC wrt q^ can be rewritten as:
q^fbf(q^fb) = f(q^fb)[v(1 cfbp )+(v(cfbh`) v(1))+F (q^fb)(1 cfbp )] [1 F (q^fb)](1 cfbp )f(q^fb)
(9)
so that
q^fb  1

f[v(1  cfbp ) + (v(cfbh`)  v(1))] + F (q^fb)(1  cfbp )  [1  F (q^fb)](1  cfbp )g (10)
Comparing (3) and (10) and recalling that cp < c
fb
p , we observe that q^ > q^fb, that is the share
of high-career couples is ine¢ ciently low in the laissez-faire.
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Expression (9) has a simple interpretation in terms of cost and benets of decreasing q^ (that
is moving f(q^) couples from traditional to high-career). The LHS measures the marginal benets
in terms of extra future earnings. In the RHS, the rst two terms in brackets represent the net
lost utility from formal care and the norm cost, respectively. The last term is the Pigouvian term
which is negative because the externality imposed on all high-career couples decreases because
the average informal care falls. Formally, we have @c=@q^ = (1  cp)f(q^). Since a negative cost is
e¤ectively a benet this term could have been moved to the LHS, but since the interpretation
of (9) also shows that of (10) this presentation is more telling.11
Observe that q^fb does not depend on 	; it is the same in all Pareto e¢ cient allocations. The
rst-best level q^fb is set purely on e¢ ciency grounds to maximize the size of the cake which
is then redistributed according to social preferences (which in our case involves equalization of
utilities).
The following propositions characterizes the optimal allocation:
Proposition 2 (The optimal allocation) The optimal allocation fxfbhh; xfbh`; cfbp ; q^fbg max-
imizes the social welfare function (5) subject to the budget constraint (6) and is characterized as
follows:
(i) Couples welfare does not depend on the career choice of the mother nor on career pro-
spects: W fbh` (q) =W
fb
hh(q) 8 q: High-career couples get higher consumption because they are
compensated for their utility loss due to full private care and due to the cost of the social
norm.
(ii) Formal child care cfbp (q) = c
fb
p is the same for all traditional couples and satises (7). It is
chosen such that the negative externality induced by the social norm is fully internalized.
(iii) The share of high-career couples is given by 1   F (q^fb) where the marginal couple q^fb is
dened in (10).
(iv) The optimal level of the GWG entails a child penalty and a sorting di¤erential equivalent
to F (q^fb)

1  cfbp

y and
R q^fb
0 qf(q)dq; respectively.
Point (iv) directly follows from substituting (cfbp ; q^fb) into equation (4).
3.1 Welfare analysis of the laissez-faire allocation
By comparing the optimal allocation and the market outcome we can establish in which sense
the laissez-faire allocation is ine¢ cient.
11Similarly, multiplying both sides of (9) by  1, would be more in line with the original FOC, because it then
measures the cost and benets (reversed from the interpretation discussed) of increasing bq.
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Proposition 3 (Welfare analysis of the laissez-faire) In the laissez-faire allocation:
(i) Within each career path, welfare di¤ers across couples; it increases with career prospect q:
(ii) Formal child care, cp, is ine¢ ciently low and informal care, ch`, is too high. This is due to
the negative externality that informal care exerts on high-career mothers through the social
norm.
(iii) Female participation in the high-career path is ine¢ ciently low, q^fb < q^.
(iv) In the GWG, both the child penalty and adverse sorting are ine¢ ciently high.
In the rst-best all couples receive the same welfare. Proposition 3(i) shows that, in the
laissez-faire, welfare is increasing in q both among traditional couples and among career couples.
Thus, welfare is equalized neither across couples belonging to di¤erent career paths nor across
couples within the same career path.
Point (ii) shows that the negative externality translates into under consumption of formal
child care by traditional couples in laissez-faire (cp < c
fb
p ). Point (iii) concerns the share
of women entering the high-career path which is ine¢ ciently low in laissez-faire. When the
negative externality is internalized, formal child care increases and the cost of the social norm
falls. As a result the high-career path is more attractive in the rst-best, or q^ > q^fb.
Finally, point (iv) requires some explanations. For any given q; in the laissez faire, the female
spouses earnings are less than or equal to her rst-best earnings. Indeed, child penalty is lower
in the rst-best because womens labor income is higher due to the higher formal child care
(cp < c
fb
p ). The optimal level of child penalty is thus obtained when the negative externality
exerted by traditional mothers on career mothers is properly taken into account. This claries
why, in the model, e¢ ciency is reached via the appropriate reduction of child care related
inequalities. Finally, adverse sorting is lower because more women enter the high-career path
and benet from future prospects (q^ > q^fb).
4 Decentralizing the rst-best allocation
Decentralization of the rst-best solution requires a subsidy s on formal child care and individu-
alized lump-sum taxes or transfers Th`(q) and Thh(q). When a subsidy s is in place, the net
price of private child care is pn = p   s = y   s; and a traditional couples optimal child care
decision solves:
v0(1  cp)  s = v0(cp): (11)
Comparing (11) with (7) shows that a subsidy of
sfb = [1  F (q^fb)] (12)
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implements the rst-best level of child care. Since formal and informal care sum up to one, a
subsidy on market care is e¤ectively a tax on informal care. According to equation (12) sfb
corresponds to a Pigouvian tax on informal child care; it equals the marginal social cost of the
externality informal care imposes on high-career couples.
The lump-sum transfers Th`(q) and Thh(q) must be chosen such that welfare levels between
all couples are equalized, that is
Wh`(q) = y + q + s
fbcfbp + v(1  cfbp ) + v(cfbp ) + Th`(q) =W fb when q  q^fb;
Whh(q) = y + (1 + )q + s
fb + v(1)  c+ Thh(q) =W fb when q  q^fb:
Decentralizing q^fb further requires Th`(q^fb) = Thh(q^fb). To see this note that when Th`(q^) =
Thh(q^) the marginal couple dened by Wh`(q^) =Whh(q^) is determined by
y + q^ + sfbcfbp + v(1  cfbp ) + v(cfbp )
= y + (1 + )q^ + sfb + v(1)  c
, q^ = 1

[v(1  cfbp ) + 

v(cfbp )  v(1)

+ c  sfb(1  cfbp )] (13)
Using (12) together with c = F (q^)(1   cfbp ) shows that (13) and (10) coincide once formal
child care is subsidized at the Pigouvian rate.
Hence, with su¢ ciently powerful instruments e¢ ciency and redistribution can be addressed
separately: the Pigouvian subsidy sfb on private child care optimally reduces informal child care
provision (and thus child penalties) while the transfers Th`(q) and Thh(q) assure equal welfare
to all couples. Note that the individualized transfers redistribute from high to low q couples but
also compensate the high-career couples for their utility losses due to full private care and to
their cost of the social norm.12
We now turn to the study of second-best policies.
5 Linear policy
First, we consider a simple policy under which instruments are restricted in an ad hoc way.
In other words, we remain agnostic about the information structure. We assume that the
instruments necessary to implement the rst-best are not available (specically the individualized
transfers) and consider a simple policy which is empirically appealing and e¤ectively used in
practice.
12 In Barigozzi et al. (2018), the social norm is determined by child-care decisions made by the median couple
of the preceding generation. With this di¤erent specication of the norm it turns out that a Pigouvian subsidy
does not restore e¢ ciency but reduces informal care too much. Hence the optimal subsidy must be set below the
Pigouvian rule.
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The considered policy consists of a uniform (linear) subsidy s on market child care, nanced
by a uniform lump-sum tax  . The governments budget constraint is then given by
 = sF (q^(pn))cp(p
n) + s[1  F (q^(pn))]:
Recall that pn = p   s = y   s is the net, after subsidy, price of market care. Let us denote
csp = cp(p
n) consumption of formal care under the linear subsidy s: As before it is implicitly
determined by:
v0(1  csp)  s = v0(csp) (14)
The social welfare function can be written as:
SW (s; ) =
Z q^(pn)
0
	
 
y + q + scp(p
n)   + v(1  cp(pn)) + v(cp(pn))

f(q)dq
+
Z Q
q^(pn)
	
 
y + (1 + )q + s   + v(1)  c(pn)f(q)dq; (15)
where q^s = q^(pn) and c(pn) = F (q^s)(1  cp(pn)). The FOC wrt  is given by:
 =
Z Q
0
	0(q)f(q)dq  E[	0]; (16)
where E is the expectation operator and where 	(q) is dened as 	(Wh`(q)) for h` couples and
as 	(Whh(q)) for hh couples. This equation has a familiar avor from linear taxation models,
in particular Sheshinski (1972). It states that the social marginal cost of raising an additional
dollar, , should be equal to its social marginal benet, E[	0]. Now dene:
Eh`[	
0] 
R q^s
0 	
0(q)f(q)dq
F (q^)
and Ehh[	
0] 
R Q
q^s 	
0(q)f(q)dq
1  F (q^) ; (17)
which represent the average marginal utilities of income by traditional and high-career couples
respectively.
The FOC with respect to s is given by:
F (q^s)Eh`[	
0]csp + (1  F (q^s))Ehh[	0]

1 + F (q^s)
dcsp
dpn
  (1  csp)f(q^s)
dq^s
dpn

  

F (q^s)csp   sF (q^s)
dcsp
dpn
+ s(1  csp)f(q^s)
dq^s
dpn
+ 1  F (q^s)

= 0: (18)
Noting that E[csp] = F (q^
s)cp + 1   F (q^s) we show in Appendix A.4 that the optimal linear
subsidy on formal child care, so, amounts to:
so = 
(1  F (q^s))Ehh[	0]
E[	0]
  cov[	
0; csp]
E[	0]@E[c
s
p]
@pn
(19)
The rst expression is the Pigouvian term and the second term is the redistributive term. When
	00 = 0 so that social welfare is not concave and there is no concern for redistribution and the
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above expression reduces to so = [1   F (q^s)], which is the rst-best Pigouvian rule. From
expression (13) this also yields q^ = q^s so that we return to the rst-best allocation. When
the social welfare function is concave, we have cov[	0; csp] < 0 since families with higher formal
care have a higher welfare. In the Appendix we show that @E[csp]=@p
n < 0 so that the second
term on the RHS in expression (19) is negative (a positive fraction is preceded by a negative
sign). Redistributive concerns thus decrease optimal child care subsidies since it is mainly the
high-career couples who prot from such subsidies. Furthermore, we have Ehh[	0] < E[	0]
so that the Pigouvian term is also reduced compared to its rst-best counterpart. This is
because the externality a¤ects high career-couples who in the second-best have a lower social
marginal utility. The marginal social damage of the externality is determined by converting their
(marginal) utility into social (marginal) utility, which is achieved by the term Ehh[	0]=E[	0].13
Consequently, we have so < sfb; see Appendix A.4 for the formal proof.
Proposition 4 (Linear child care subsidy) The optimal linear policy when redistribution is
relevant (	00 > 0) implies:
(i) so < sfb because it is mainly the high-career couples who prot from this policy. Thus,
formal child care purchased by traditional couples, csp, is ine¢ ciently low

cfbp > csp

;
(ii) and q^s > q^fb so that there are more traditional couples in the second best than in the rst-
best. The marginal couple is distorted upwards to reduce the share of high career couples
receiving the subsidy for full-time formal care which improves redistribution.
(iii) In the GWG, both child penalties and adverse sorting are ine¢ ciently high.
The intuition for (iii) is the same as for the corresponding point in Proposition 3. As
expected, the linear subsidy mitigates the ine¢ ciency of the laissez-faire informal care provision
but does not fully restore e¢ ciency. However, welfare is obviously higher with the linear policy
than in the laissez faire.
6 Nonlinear policy
Now, we take a di¤erent approach and assume that the available policies are not restricted in an
ad hoc way. Instead, we study the design of the best policy that is available given the information
structure. This is not just a matter of theoretical interest. The important underlying practical
question is whether the distortions characterized in the previous section are unavoidable once
redistribution under asymmetric information is involved, or whether they are simply artifacts of
the linearity of the considered policy.
13 In the FB, utilities are equalized so that this term is equal to one.
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Under full information this approach yields the rst-best, but this supposes that all relevant
variables, including a couples high-career earning opportunities q are publicly observable. We
shall now assume that q is not publicly observable but that both the career path and the level
of market care are observable at the individual (couples) level. The government can then
o¤er two contracts conditioned on the reported type ~q denoted by fJ(~q); cgp(~q); T (~q)g ; where
J 2 fh`; hhg indicates the career path, T is the transfer that households have to pay and cgp(~q)
is the amount of formal child care provided by the government. Since cgp(~q) is observable at the
couples level, the distinction between in-kind provision and a nonlinear taxation of market care
is not relevant; see Cremer and Gahvari (1997). To be more precise, this is simply a matter of
practical implementation of the underlying optimal contract. This implies, in particular, that
when cgp(~q) is interpreted as in-kind provision, topping up is not possible.14 As usual we shall,
without loss of generality, concentrate on incentive compatible contracts.
Given that no topping up is possible it must be cgp(q) = 1 for all hh couples. In addition,
given that, conditional on the career path, all families have the same preferences for child care, it
is impossible to separate families according to q once the career path has been assigned. Hence,
the government o¤ers only two contracts: fTh`; cgpg for h`-couples and fThh; 1g for hh-couples.
In other words, all traditional couples consume the same level of market care and face the same
tax or transfer. The same is true for all high-career couples.15
The average externality now is c = F (q^g)
 
1  cgh`

; where q^g indicates future prospects
of the marginal couple, or the couple such that welfare is the same in the two career paths,
q^g :Whh(q^
g) =Wh`(q^
g).
The government maximizes the following welfare function:
max
Th`;c
g
p;Thh;q^g
SW =
Z q^g
0
	(y + q + cgpy   Th` + v
 
1  cgp

+ v
 
cgp
| {z })
Wh`
f (q) dq
+
Z Q
q^g
	(2y + (1 + ) q   Thh + v (1)  F (q^g)
 
1  cgp
| {z })
Whh
f (q) dq (20)
subject to the budget constraint
F (q^g)Th` + [1  F (q^g)]Thh   p

F (q^g) cgp + 1  F (q^g)
  0; (21)
and subject to the following incentive constraint:
2y + (1 + ) q^g   Thh + v (1)  F (q^g)
 
1  cgp

   y + q^g + cgh`y   Th` + v  1  cgp+ v  cgp = 0: (22)
14With the considered information structure it can be prevented and nothing can be gained by allowing it.
15This is a well known property in contract theory and we skip the proof. To establish the results formally one
has to maximize social welfare subject to the budget and incentive constraints. A simple rst-order approach will
show that the solution involves pooling within each career group.
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Since there is pooling in both groups, incentive compatibility requires simply that q^g is indi¤erent
between the two career paths. This follows because @Whh(q)=@q = 1 +  > @Wh`(q)=@q = 1
so that Whh increases faster in q than Wh`. Consequently, condition (22) ensures that no high-
career couple with future earnings q  q^g should have an incentive to mimic a traditional couple,
that is Whh(q)  Wh`(q) 8 q 2 [q^g; Q]. Similarly, it implies that no traditional couple wants to
mimic a high career couple.
We denote the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the budget constraint and the incentive
constraint b and  respectively. Using the expectation operators dened in (17) we can write
the FOCs with respect to the transfers Th` and Thh as:
  F (q^g)Eh`[	00]F (q^g) + + bF (q^g) = 0 (23)
  (1  F (q^g))Ehh[	00] [1  F (q^g)]  + b [1  F (q^g)] = 0 (24)
Combining (23) and (24) and rearranging yields:
b = Z q^g
0
	0 () f(q)dq +
Z Q
q^g
	0 () f(q)dq = E 	0 : (25)
This equation simply states that the marginal cost of raising additional revenue, b, must be equal
to its marginal social benet, E[	0]. The FOC with respect to formal child care for traditional
couples, cgp, is given by:Z q^g
0
	0 () y   v0  1  cgp+ v0  cgp f (q) dq + Z Q
q^g
	0 () F (q^g) f(q)dq
  bpF (q^g) +  F (q^g)  y + v0  1  cgp  v0  cgp = 0 (26)
In Appendix A.5 we show that by using (24) and (25) the (26) reduces to:
v0(1  cgp) + v(cgp) = [1  F (q^g)]: (27)
Comparing this expression to (11) shows that the level of child care cgp can be decentralized by
a subsidy on market care given by:
sg = [1  F (q^g)]: (28)
Consequently, the public provision of cgp corresponds to an implicit subsidy on market care which
is set according to the Pigouvian rule dened by (12). In other words, it reects the marginal
social damage which is here measured by the extra norm cost imposed on all career couples.
This is an interesting result because it implies that the downward distortion on s implied by the
redistributive bias obtained in the previous section indeed appears to be an artifact of the ad
hoc restrictions imposed on the policy, namely its simple linear specication. When the policy is
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constrained only by the information structure this distortion vanishes. However, while sg is set
according to the rst-best Pigouvian rule, its actual level will di¤er from sfb, unless q^g = q^fb.
This brings us to the next question namely the comparison between q^g and q^fb. This amounts
to studying whether the solution under asymmetric information involves a distortion on the
marginal couple and if yes in which direction.
The FOC with respect to q^g can be written as:
	(Wh` (q^
g)) 	(Whh (q^g))  f(q^g)(1  cgp)(1  F (q^g))Ehh[	0]
+ b f (q^g) (Th`   Thh) + pf (q^g)  1  cgp+    f (q^g)  1  cgp = 0; (29)
where the rst two terms vanish because of the incentive constraint.
The approach is to evaluate the FOC for q^g at q^fb while adjusting all the other endogenous
variables according to their respective FOCs.16 When q^g = q^fb we have from (27) that cgp = c
fb
p .
In Appendix A.6 we show that
Th`   Thh = [1  F (q^fb)](1  cgp)  y(1  cgp): (30)
Solving (24) for  and inserting (30) in (29), we have:
@L
@q^g

q^g=q^fb
=  Ehh[	0](1  F (q^g))f(q^fb)(1  cgp)
+ E[	0]
h
f(q^fb)( y(1  cgp) + (1  F (q^fb))(1  cgp)) + f(q^fb)y(1  cgp)
i
+ [ Ehh[	0](1  F (q^g)) + E[	0](1  F (q^fb))][  f(q^fb)(1  cgp)]
=(1  F (q^fb))(E[	0]  Ehh[	0]) > 0: (31)
So that we have q^g > q^fb. In words, the second-best solution implies an upward distortion of the
marginal couple q^g. Consequently, there are more traditional couples in the second-best solution
than in the rst-best.
To understand this expression note that a couple with q  bq enjoys an informational rent of
(q   bq) =Whh(q) Whh(bq). Total rents are thus given by:
R =
Z Q
bq (q   bq)f(q)dq
and we have:17
@R
@bq =  
Z Q
bq f(q)dq =  [1  F (bq)]:
16 If the other variables were held constant the sign of the derivative would be inconclusive. However, adjusting
all the other variables in an optimal way reduces the problem to a single dimension so that the derivative is
informative. As an example, consider the maximization of f(x; y) and denote the solution (x; y). Showing that
at any given point (x; y), @f=@x > 0 is not enough to show that x > x. However, by using the FOC for y we
reduce the problem to the maximization of f(x; y(x)) and the derivative of this expression allows us to compare
x and x, as long as the problem is concave which we have to assume anyway.
17Note that the derivative wrt the lower bound is zero.
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Under full information these rents can be extracted and redistributed. Under asymmetric in-
formation they cannot because of the incentive constraint. As bq increases the extra amount
[1   F (bq)] can be extracted and redistributed which implies a social benet of (E[	0]  
Ehh[	
0])(1   F (q^fb)). In words, the second-best solution involves an upward distortion in
the marginal couple in order to reduce informational rents of the high-career couples. This
means that by increasing the level of q of the marginal couple more tax revenue can be extracted
from the high-career couple and redistributed to the traditional couples with lower income, so
that welfare increases.
We can now also return to the levels of the implicit subsidy implied by the policy. Equation
(12) and (28) together with q^g > q^fb imply sg < sfb, so that asymmetric information leads to a
lower implicit subsidy on formal care. Intuitively, the strict Pigouvian rule applies in both cases
but with q^g > q^fb the group of high-career couples a¤ected by the externality is smaller so that
its marginal social damage is also smaller. Consequently, using (11) well also have cgp < c
fb
p . As
in the linear case all these results emerge as long as 	
00
< 0 so that social welfare is concave and
there is a concern for redistribution. When 	
00
= 0 we return to the rst-best solution.
To sum up, while the nonlinear policy brings us back to the rst-best Pigouvian rule for the
marginal subsidy, it continues to imply a downward distortion on formal care and there will be
more traditional couples than e¢ cient. Consequently, the potential conict between child care
provision and redistribution does not solely arise with linear instruments.
Finally, let us revisit the underlying information structure. We have assumed for simplicity
that a couples formal care and career path are observable. We have made this assumption
for the ease of exposition, but the arguments and results we presented make clear that the
observability of the career path is e¤ectively not necessary. The policy we characterize here can
be implemented as long as a couples level of formal care is observable. This is because high-
career couples need full-time care so that their choice of child care would reveal any attempt to
mimic a traditional couple. Similarly, a traditional couple mimicking a high-career one would
have to choose full-time day care so that mimicking involves the same consumption bundle with
or without observable career paths.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume that couplesformal child care is observable and can be provided publicly
at level cgp(q) or subject to a nonlinear tax or subsidy. The optimal incentive compatible policy
when redistribution is relevant (	00 < 0) implies:
(i) that there is pooling within the traditional and the high career couples groups: all traditional
couples receive the same level of formal care and pay the same tax and similarly for all
high career couples.
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(ii) that high-career couples receive full-time formal care, while the level of cgp implies an implicit
marginal subsidy which is determined by the Pigouvian rule: it equals sg = [1   F (q^g)]
which reects the marginal social damage represented by the norm cost imposed on the
high-career couples.
(iii) q^g > q^fb so that there are more traditional couples in the second best than in the rst-best.
The marginal couple is distorted upwards to reduce the high-career couplesinformational
rents which improves redistribution.
(iv) sg < sfb; while both levels are set according to the Pigouvian rule, the inequality follows
because there are less high-career couples in the second best so that the marginal social
damage of the norm cost is smaller.
(v) that, in the GWG, both child penalties and adverse sorting are ine¢ ciently high.
The intuition for (v) is the same as for the corresponding part in Propositions 3 and 4.
Again, the policy mitigates the ine¢ ciency of the laissez-faire informal care provision but while
welfare is obviously higher with the nonlinear policy than with the linear one rst-best e¢ ciency
is not restored.
7 Policy discussion
Elizabeth Warren (a democratic candidate for the US presidential elections) has included uni-
versal child careas a main pillar in her electoral platform. Similarly, in recent Bavarian elections
a new Free voters of Bavariamovement managed to unsettle the traditional Christian Demo-
cratic majority in the regional parliament with a program aiming at o¤ering free child care to all
families. Whether or not these are realistic policy options or utopian visions that are impossible
to nance (and mainly a boon for well o¤ couples) remains to be seen. But these two examples
(which could be completed by many others) show how signicant these issues are in practice.
Policy choices that are made in the coming years may a¤ect gender roles (and even fertility
decisions) for many decades to come.
In most countries the current situation is not the laissez-faire allocation used as reference in
our analysis. Various policies already provide child care and early childhood education. In the
majority of countries, education now begins for most well before 5 years old: 71.5% of young
children aged 3 and 4 years are enrolled in education across OECD countries as a whole, and this
rises to 79.8% in the OECD countries that are part of the European Union.18 Publicly-funded
18Enrolment rates for early childhood education at this age range from over 90% in Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Iceland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, at one end of the
spectrum, to less than a third in Australia, Greece, Korea, Switzerland and Turkey.
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pre-primary provision tends to be more strongly developed in the European than in the non-
European countries of the OECD. In Europe, the concept of universal access of 3- to 6-year-olds
is generally accepted. Most European countries provide all children with at least two years of
free, publicly-funded provision before they begin primary provision. Public expenditure on early
childhood and educational care, in cash or in kind, represents today on average 0.8 percent of
GDP in OECD countries.19
Typically, neither the nursery school nor the primary school provide a form of child care
which fully covers the needs of full-time working parents. Apart from Scandinavian countries, the
demand for day-care centers is signicantly larger than the available capacity, even in countries
with long parental leave.20 In countries where public funding for such provision is limited,
most working parents must either seek solutions in the private market, where ability to pay
signicantly inuences accessibility to quality services, or else rely on informal arrangements
with family, friends and neighbors; see OECD (2010).
Fees charged to parents for publicly provided early child-care are often high. Parents in
Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom face some of the highest out-of-
pocket costs for centre-based care in Europe. Even though all countries except Ireland provide
additional nancial support for families on very low incomes, net fees often remain high in
absolute terms.21 This explains, at least to some extent, the fact that children are more likely
to use early childhood education and care services when they come from relatively advantaged
socio-economic backgrounds; see OECD (2017).
To sum up, currently most child care systems are not designed in such a way to accommodate
parentsworking hours. The supply of day-care facilities is rationed in terms of spots available,
opening hours are generally too short and fees tend to be quite high for children of 03 years of
age. As long as this remains the case, child care policies notwithstanding, the current situation
su¤ers from the same deciencies as the laissez-faire in our model. The policies we present,
though only second best, would represent a step in the right direction.
Our model shows that a free for allapproach would be neither e¢ cient nor fair. This would
19 It attains 2 percent in Denmark, and is above 1 percent in the rest of Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, and
France. North American and Southern EU countries have the lowest rates of early childhood public spending. In
the United States, early childhood public spending is 0.4 percent of GDP; see OECD (2014).
20Average hours in early childhood education and care di¤er substantially across countries. In most OECD
countries, children (0- to- 2-year-olds) in early childhood education and care use it for an average of somewhere
between 25 and 35 hours during a usual week, with the OECD average just under 30 hours per week. However,
in some countries (e.g. Iceland, Latvia and Portugal) average hours approach 40 hours during a usual week. In
others, such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 0- to 2-year-olds in early education centers are there
for an average of less than 20 hours during a usual week.
21 In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom the out-of-pocket cost of full-time centre-based care for two
children (aged 2 and 3) in a low-earning dual-earner family works out at around 20% of family disposable income,
and at 35% in Ireland.
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be overshooting in the opposite direction. Our analysis suggests that attendance can be used as
a devise to screen high- and low-income families because the number of hours children spend in
day-care represents a proxy for the familys income. Hence, fees contingent on the time children
spend in the facility are e¢ ciency enhancing. However, in OECD countries, day-care fees are
generally based on enrolment and possibly on familys income but to a much lower extent on
hours of attendance.22 In addition, information about hours of attendance is typically easier
to collect than information about family income or wealth and is not falsiable. Which again
points at childrens hours of attendance as a practical screening instrument.
8 Conclusion
We have studied the design of child-care policies when womens career choices are endogenous.
High career mothers su¤er from a norm cost caused by mothersguilt. Through their child
care choices low career mothers create a negative externality via the norm cost. Consequently,
the laissez faire solution is ine¢ cient; it implies too much informal child care and a share of
high-career mothers which is too low.
Child-care policies are e¤ective in enhancing e¢ ciency and reducing gender inequalities.
However, since they provide larger benets to high income couples, they tend to be regressive.
Under full information, this e¤ect can be o¤set by lump-sum transfers and the optimal policy is a
Pigouvian subsidy on formal child care. A uniform subsidy, on the other hand, involves a trade-
o¤ between e¢ ciency and redistribution across couples and should be set below the Pigouvian
level. Under a nonlinear policy the rst-best Pigouvian rule for the (marginal) subsidy on
informal care is reestablished. While the share of high career mothers continues to be distorted
downward for incentive reasons, this policy is e¤ective in reconciling the objectives of reducing
the child care related gender inequalities and achieving a more equal income distribution across
couples.
From a practical perspective a non-linear policy can be implemented through in-kind pro-
vision of child care, at di¤erent levels, depending on the mothers career path, and nanced
with non-linear taxes. Alternatively non-linear subsidies on market care can be used.23 Either
way, day-care fees should be contingent on the amount of time children spend in the facility.
22A nancial contribution is demanded of all parents who use the public child-care services before compulsory
school; this is rarely as much as the unit cost of the service and may be adjusted in accordance with criteria, such
as size and income of the family. In most OECD countries, the contribution demanded of parents only depends
on their income; see OECD (2017).
23See also Cremer and Gahvari (1997) who show that when individual consumption levels are observable, in-
kind transfers and nonlinear subsidies are equivalent. This information structure also di¤erentiates our model
from the extensive literature on in-kind transfers of which child care is of course a prime example (see Blomquist
and Chirstiansen, 1995, or Blomquist et al., 2010, for two examples amongst many).
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More generally, our model indicates that providing free child care to allis problematic. While
universal provision of preschool child care is desirable, free access is never optimal because it
represents a too regressive policy.
Our model has ignored a certain number of important aspects. For instance, we do not
consider the welfare of children and the impact of early education on their human capital. There
is now ample evidence that high quality formal child care yields better outcome for the children
than informal care by less advantaged mothers (see Duncan and Sojourner, 2013, Cornelissen et
al., forthcoming). This is likely to call for an even more generous child care policy and tend to
increase subsidies. We have also ignored the issue of explicit means testing. This would require
a more complex information structure to keep the problem interesting. In essence we would
have to combine our approach with a more traditional optimal tax model inspired, for instance,
by Casarico et al. (2015). These and further extensions are on our research agenda.
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Appendix
A.1 Couplesoptimization
A.1.1 Only the mother enters the high-career path
Since the mother is in the high-career path, she is not able to take care of the children, and
cm = 0. Hence, cm   ch` > 0 and the mother su¤ers the cost of not conforming to the norm. If
the father provides some child care he su¤ers because of the norm too, so that here both social
norms are potentially binding.
Welfare of this couple is denoted by W`h. Noting that c`h + cp = 1 and p = y; the couple
chooses cf = c`h to maximize:
max
c`h
W`h = y + q + v(c`h) + v(1  c`h)  f (maxf0; c`h   cfg)  mcm:
Optimal child care provision, c`h; is implicitly determined by:
v0(c`h) = v
0(1  ch`) + If
where I is an indicator function which takes value 1 when the social norm for fathers is binding,
namely when c`h > cf , and 0 otherwise.
Indirect welfare W `h writes:
W `h = y + q + v(c

`h) + v(1  c`h)  f (maxf0; c`h   cfg)  mcm:
A.1.2 Both couples enter the low-career path
Here again, if the father provides some child care, he su¤ers because he deviates from the norm.
Both social norms are potentially binding. Welfare of this couple is denoted by W``. Noting
that cm + cf + cp = 1 and p = y; the couple chooses c`` = cm + cf to maximize:
max
cm;cf
W`` =(1  cf ) y + (1  cm) y   p(1  c``)
+ v(c``) + v(1  c``)  f (maxf0; c`h   cfg)  m(maxf0; cm   cmg)
=y + v(c``) + v(1  c``)  f (maxf0; c`h   cfg)  m(maxf0; cm   cmg)
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Optimal child care provision, c`` = c

m + c

f ; is implicitly determined by the two conditions:
v0(cf )  v0(1  c``) + If
v0(cm)  v0(1  c``) + Im
Welfare W `` now is:
W `` = y + v(c

``) + v(1  c``)  f (maxf0; cf   cfg)  m(maxf0; cm   cmg):
A.2 The optimal allocation
Denoting  the Lagrangean multiplier with respect to the budget constraint, the FOCs of (5)
with respect to the couplesconsumption levels can be rewritten as:
@SW
@xh` (q)
= 	0(Wh`(q))f (q)  f (q) = 0 8q  q^
@SW
@xhh (q)
= 	0(Whh(q))f (q)  f (q) = 0 8q > q^:
so that:
	0(W fbhh(q)) = 	
0(W fbh` (q)) =  , W fbh` (q) =W fbhh(q) 8q:
Equalizing welfare levels across career paths, we can write:
xfbh`(q) + v(1  cfbp (q)) + v(cfbp (q)) = xfbhh(q) + v(1)  F (q^fb)(1  cfbp (q)) 8q: (A.1)
We now consider the point-by-point derivative of the social welfare with respect to cp (q) :
Given that cp(q) exerts a negative e¤ect on all hh couples we have:
	0(W fbh` (c
fb
p (q)))
 @W fbh` (cfbp (q))
@cfbp (q)
f (q) +
Z Q
q^
	0(W fbhh("))
@W fbhh(")
@c
 @c
@cfbp (q)
f (") d" = 0
which gives:
	0(W fbh` )
h
v0(1  cfbp (q))  v0(cfbhp (q))
i
f (q) +
Z Q
q^
	0(W fbhh) ( f (q)) f (") d" = 0
Considering that W fbh` =W
fb
hh, we can simplify the previous equation as follows:
v0(1  cfbp (q))  v0(cfbp (q))  
Z Q
q^
f (") d" = 0
showing that it must be cfbp (q) = c
fb
p 8q: Rearranging, the above equation we obtain (26) in the
main text.
Taking the derivative of the social welfare function with respect to the marginal couple q^
and rearranging, yields:
q^f(q^fb) = f(q^fb)
h
xfbhh(q^
fb)  xfbh`(q^fb)  [1  F (q^fb)](1  cfbp )
i
: (A.2)
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Given that cp (q) = cp 8q; we observe that xfbh`(q) = xfbh` and xfbhh(q) = xfbhh 8q. Hence, equation
(??) can be rewritten as:
xfbhh   xfbh` = v(1  cfbp ) + [v(cfbp )  v(1)] + F (q^fb)(1  cfbp ) > 0 (A.3)
With (A.3) we can rewrite (A.2) as (9) in the main text.
A.3 Comparative statics
Child care, cp, and the marginal couple, q^, are implicitly determined by the following two
equations:
f1(cp; q^; p
n)  y   pn   v0(1  cp) + v0(cp) = 0
f2(cp; q^; p
n)  y   q^ + cpy + pn(1  cp) + v(1  cp) + [v(cp)  v(1)] + mF (q^)(1  cp)
When we want to know the e¤ect in price changes of formal child care, we have to solve:24@f1@cp @f1@q^
@f2
@cp
@f2
@q^
35"dcp
dq^
#
=  
"
@f1
@pn
@f2
@pn
#
dpn:
Inserting the derivatives and inverting the rst matrix, we have:"
dcp
dq^
#
=
1
D
"
 + f(q^)(1  cp) 0
F (q^) v00(1  cp) + v00(cp)
#"
1
 (1  cp)
#
dpn;
where D = [ + f(q^)(1  cp)][v00(1  cp) + v00(cp)] > 0. We thus have:
dcp
dpn
=
1
v00(1  cp) + v00(cp) < 0 (A.4)
dq^
dpn
=
 [v00(1  cp) + v00(cp)](1  cp) + F (q^)
[ + f(q^)(1  cp)][v00(1  cp) + v00(cp)] > 0 (A.5)
A.4 Uniform subsidies
The FOC wrt s can be written as
E[	0cp] + (1  F (q^))Ehh[	0]

F (q^)
dcp
dpn
  (1  cp)f(q^)
dq^
dpn

  E[	0]E[cp]
  E[	0]s

 F (q^) dc

p
dpn
+ (1  cp)f(q^)
dq^
dpn

= 0;
where E[cp] = F (q^(pn))cp(pn) + 1  F (q^(pn)). Noting that
@E[cp]
@pn
= F (q^)
dcp
dpn
  (1  cp)f(q^)
dq^
dpn
< 0
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and cov[	0; cp] = E[	0cp]  E[	0]E[cp], we can write
@SW
@s
= cov[	0; cp]  (1  F (q^))Ehh[	0]
@E[cp]
@pn
+ E[	0]s
@E[cp]
@pn
: (A.6)
Setting this expression equal to zero and solving for s yields equation (19). Further evaluating
(A.6) at the Pigouvian level sfb = [1  F (q^fb)]m, which from (13) implies q^ = q^fb yields
@SW
@s

s=sfb
= cov[	0; cp] (1 F (q^fb))Ehh[	0]
@E[cp]
@pn
+E[	0][1 F (q^fb)]m
@E[cp]
@pn
= cov[	0; cp] < 0
(A.7)
so that assuming concavity we must have so < sfb.
A.5 Proof of equation (27)
The FOC wrt cgh` is given by:Z q^g
0
	0 () y   v0  1  cgh`+ v0  cgh` f (q) dq + Z Q
q^g
	0 () F (q^g) f(q)dq
  bpF (q^g) +  F (q^g)  y + v0  1  cgh`  v0  cgh` = 0:
With equations (24) and (25) and the following denitions:
Eh`[	
0] =
R q^g
0 	
0()f(q)dq
F (q^g)
and Ehh[	
0] =
R Q
q^g 	
0()f(q)dq
1  F (q^g)
we can rewrite the above FOC as:
Eh`[	
0]F (q^g)[y   v0(1  cgh`) + v0(cgh`)] + F (q^g)Ehh[	0](1  F (q^g))  E[	0]yF (q^g)
+ [ Ehh[	0](1  F (q^g)) + E[	0](1  F (q^g))]

F (q^g)  y + v0  1  cgh`  v0  cgh` = 0:
Noting that Eh`[	0]F (q^g) + Ehh[	0](1  F (q^g)) = E[	0], we can write:
E[	0][y   v0(1  cgh`) + v0(cgh`)]  E[	0]yF (q^g)
+ E[	0](1  F (q^g))[F (q^g)  y + v0  1  cgh`  v0  cgh`] = 0
which reduces to:
[1  F (q^g)]   v0(1  cgh`) + v0(cgh`) = 0:
A.6 Proof of equation (30)
Solving the IC constraint for Th`   Thh yields
Th`   Thh =  y   q^g   v (1) + F (q^g)
 
1  cgh`

+ cgh`y + v
 
1  cgh`

+ v
 
cgh`

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From (13) we have the rst-best marginal couple:
q^fb  1

h
v(cfbh`) + v(1  cfbh`)  v(1) + F (q^fb)cfbh`   [1  F (q^fb)]cfbh`
i
We now substitute cgh` = 1  cfbh` and q^g = q^fb:
Th`   Thh =  y   v(1  cgh`)  v(cgh`) + v(1)  F (q^fb)(1  cgh`) + [1  F (q^fb)](1  cgh`)
  v (1) + F (q^fb)  1  cgh`+ cgh`y + v  1  cgh`+ v  cgh` :
The above equation simplies to:
Th`   Thh = [1  F (q^fb)](1  cgh`)  y(1  cgh`):
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